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INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF
DOMESTIC NATIONAL SECURITY
MEASURES: THE FORGOTTEN ROLE OF
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
CarlaL. Reyes'

The current perception of the United Nations as the only institution
charged with governing international security issues was neither
intended nor required.Although the historical development of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) caused a significant shift in its
governance.focus, the WTO is uniquely situated to remedy several of
the governancefailures suffered by the United Nations and to act as
an effective governor of national security in the economic sphere.
Need for such an alternative governance mechanism is especially
acute when nation-states refuse to recognize the authority of the
United Nations over a security dispute or when a veto-holding
Security Council member is the subject of internationalconcern. I
first examine the historicaldevelopment of the internationalsecurity
governance system and uncover the substantive authority of the WTO
to govern the economic aspects of nationalsecurity issues. I then use
the parallel proceedings brought by Nicaragua before the
InternationalCourt of Justice and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade dispute settlement system to dispel common objections to
J.D. and LL.M in International and Comparative Law, Duke University School of Law,
Class of 2009; M.P.P., Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University. I would like
to thank Professor Scott Silliman for his guidance and helpful feedback. I would also like to
thank my husband, Mario C. Reyes, for his unconditional love and support.
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WTO governance in the national security arena. Finally, I
demonstrate how U.S. imposition of unilateral economic sanctions
on Iran presents a current opportunityfor WTO governance in the
global war on terror.
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INTRODUCTION

Military activity is rarely the only strategy governments employ to
protect national security interests. For instance, the U.S. maintains a policy
of imposing economic sanctions against Iran to curtail its nuclear program,'
and France's foreign affairs minister warned Russia in August 2008 that
continued violence in Georgia might lead to the imposition of economic
sanctions. 2 Despite the fact that governments use such economic
mechanisms to address national security concerns, the international
community perceives the United Nations as the sole governance authority in
the security arena. Unfortunately, enforcement difficulties plague the United
Nations' governance record. The United Nations' effectiveness is especially
limited when Security Council members such as China stall efforts to bring
Iran into compliance with Security Council Resolutions, or when a Security
Council member is the aggressor, as with Russia in the Georgia example.
Arguably, the international governance system would benefit from an
additional governance mechanism in the national security arena.
Although its role in the national security arena has been forgotten, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) was designed to be the kind of
supplementary governance mechanism the international community needs.
The WTO governs a variety of international economic treaties that prohibit
certain restrictive trade measures countries often employ in furtherance of
their national security objectives. Of particular interest is the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which prohibits embargos and
quotas, two of the most frequently used economic tools for protecting
national security interests. The WTO's failure to enforce these GATT
provisions in national security cases stems from the controversy surrounding
another GATT provision-the exception in Article XXI. WTO members
claim that because national security issues are so sensitive and so closely
related to a nation's sovereignty, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
must accept a unilateral invocation of the national security exception without
any objective inquiry into the matter. The WTO has refused to decide
whether the exception in GATT Article XXI contains objective criteria for
application and has traditionally avoided the issue. However, advances in
WTO organization and jurisprudence have rendered the WTO's cautious
approach to this area of trade disputes unnecessary.
1Peter

Baker, Obama Signs into Law Tighter Sanctions on Iran, N.Y TIMEs, July 1, 2010,

availableat www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/world/middleeast/02sanctions.html.
2 Mark Tran, Julian Borger & Ian Traynor, EU Threatens Sanctions Against Russia:
Leading
European Powers Losing Patience with Kremlin ' Sabre Rattling in the Caucasus, THE
GUARDIAN, Aug. 28, 2008, available at

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/28/eu.russia.
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The United Nations' defective mechanisms for governing economic
aspects of international security and the WTO's failure to assume its role as
co-governor strain the legitimacy of the international system. In disregard of
United Nations processes and without fear of accountability to their GATT
obligations, nations act unilaterally. The WTO's continued failure to bolster
the legitimacy of international security dispute resolution can be rectified.
The WTO's failure to exercise its authority over national security disputes
that have entered the economic sphere is an unfortunate and unnecessary
result of historical events, none of which should prevent the WTO from
assuming its rightful role in the future. The WTO dispute settlement system
should interpret the national security exception of GATT Article XXI as
containing objective criteria for applicability and should assume the mantle
of co-governor of international security.
This comment proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the concept of the
WTO as co-governor of national security issues by outlining the
international governance system, the mission shift in each governance
institution over time, and the difficulties faced by the United Nations in
enforcing international security. Part II discusses the substantive authority of
the WTO to govern the economic aspects of national security issues,
particularly focusing on the unique features of the WTO dispute settlement
system. Part III uses the parallel proceedings brought by Nicaragua before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the GATT dispute settlement
system to dispel common objections to WTO governance in the national
security arena, and Part IV uses the U.S. imposition of unilateral economic
sanctions on Iran to demonstrate a current opportunity for WTO governance
in the global war on terror.

I.

THE MISTAKEN NOTION THAT THE UNITED NATIONS GOVERNS
SECURITY, THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS GOVERN
DEVELOPMENT, AND THE WTO GOVERNS TRADE

Despite the common assumption that international governance is divided
among three sets of institutions, each allotted its own substantive governance
arena, the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions (the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank), and the World Trade Organization
were originally designed to be an interwoven international security
governance system.' Over time, each of these governance institutions
steadily evolved away from its original mandate, and the United Nations was
left the sole arbiter of international security.'
' See infra Part L.A.
4 See infra Part I.B. By international security disputes, this comment refers to conflicts
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A. The Original Vision for InternationalGovernanceInstitutions
At the end of World War II, the international community rallied around
a desire to ensure a "durable peace."' Based on the experiences of the first
and second World Wars, the international community saw sustained
international cooperation as the basic material for building lasting peace.' To
facilitate such cooperation, world leaders envisioned a network of
international institutions, which would include the United Nations, the
International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and an International Trade Organization.' Collectively, these
institutions were intended to form a system of global governance charged
with maintaining international peace and security.
The creation of the United Nations in 1945 marked the first step toward
creating the global governance system.' The United Nations was created in
order "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . to
maintain international peace and security, and . . . to employ international

machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all
peoples."o To that end, the international community endowed the United
Nations with the power to "determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"" and to respond to such
situations by imposing economic sanctions. 2 If economic sanctions proved

between nations, internal conflicts that prompt international involvement, and other such
events including "ethnic cleansing, civil war, transnational crime and terrorism." Elke
Krahmann, American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing risions of International
Security, 7 INT'L STUD. REv. 531, 531 (2005) [hereinafter Krahmann, American Hegemony].

By global security governance, this comment refers to the international organizations and
processes with the power to check the sovereign discretion of nation states as they pursue
their national security interests by making policy or enforcing existing international norms.
Id. Notably, the ideas of global governance and international security are continually
changing. See generally Elke Krahmann, Conceptualizing Security Governance, 38
COOPERATION & CONFLICT 5 (2003). This comment seeks to contribute to that literature by

suggesting an active role for the WTO in the economic sphere of global security governance.
'See Mabel Newcomer, Bretton Woods and a Durable Peace,240 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 37, 42 (1945).
Ervin P. Hexner, Worldwide International Economic Institutions: A Factual Review, 61
CoLuM. L. REv. 354, 357 (1961).
'Id. at 358.
8See id.; John W. Pehle, The Bretton Woods Institutions, 55 YALE L.J. 1127, 1127 (1946).
6

9U.N.

Charter introductory note.

1oU.N. Charter pmbl.

See also BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, & CURTIS A. BRADLEY,
977 (4th ed. 2003) ("The United Nations was created in 1945 primarily
to prevent military conflict among its members and to settle international disputes.").
1 U.N. Charter art. 39.
12 U.N. Charter
art. 41.
INTERNATIONAL LAw
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ineffective, its Charter authorizes the United Nations to use force "to
maintain or restore international peace and security." 3
However, the international community never intended the United
Nations alone to mediate conflicts of members' domestic national security
interests. Instead, it was thought that for the work of the United Nations to
be successful, international economic institutions would have to take "a
critical role in the new world that the members of the United Nations are
beginning to build ... [by] provid[ing] a favorable economic environment
for maintaining world peace." 4 The vision for international economic
institutions as global security governors stemmed from a recognition of "the
role of international economic affairs in causing World War II and [the
desire] to prevent a reoccurrence of such an event.""
The international community thus planned three complementary
international economic governance institutions meant to aid the United
Nations in providing international security governance: the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), and an International Trade Organization (ITO).
The IMF and the World Bank came into existence in 1948. The IMF was
"intended to repair the disintegration that had befallen the international
monetary system after the War."'" Specifically, the IMF's mandate centered
on "shorten[ing] the duration and lessen[ing] the degree of disequilibrium in
the international balance of payments of members." 7 To fulfill this mandate,
the IMF provided loans for members to use in "correct[ing] maladjustments
in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of
national or international prosperity."'" For its part, the World Bank was
"designed to stimulate and support foreign investment, which had declined
to insignificant amounts" after the War." To that end, the World Bank's
founding members contributed funds to be loaned for "development and
reconstruction projects alike,"2 0 with preference given to reconstruction
loans.2' Together the IMF and the World Bank formed two pillars of a three13U.N. Charter art. 42.
14Pehle, supra note 8, at 1128.
15 JoaN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM

J.

16

& ALAN 0.
217 (5th ed. 2008).

DAVEY

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF

Gerald M. Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement-Twenty-five Years After, 23

STAN.

L. REV.

235, 237 (1971).
17 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. VI, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, 2 U.N.TS. 39 [hereinafter IMF Agreement].
8 Id. at art. V.
19Meier, supra note 16, at 237.

20 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement art. III §1,
July 22, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter World Bank Agreement].
21 Id. (emphasizing loans made "[fjor the purpose of facilitating the restoration and
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pillar base for helping the United Nations achieve international security
governance.
Despite a United Nations resolution in favor of its creation,22 the
intended third pillar of the Bretton Woods system, the International Trade
Organization (ITO), never came into existence.23 Two multilateral
instruments for creating the ITO were drafted: an organizational charter and
a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) containing the basic
obligations of nations in a world trading system.2 4 The GATT was adopted
and implemented on a provisional basis by all of its contracting parties,2 5
including the U.S. 2 6 Because the charter was more controversial and U.S.
involvement so critical, most contracting parties waited to submit it to their
national governments until its fate in the U.S. had been determined.27
President Truman submitted the charter to Congress repeatedly over a twoyear period, but it met rejection each time, ultimately causing plans for the
ITO to fail.28
As a result of the ITO's failure, the international community relied on
the GATT to fill the role of global governance in trade.29 The contracting
parties simply transposed the expectation that the ITO would work with the
IMF and World Bank to the GATT. In particular, the "[IMF] and GATT
were to collaborate on exchange policies and trade policies," and "[iun
combination, the [IMF], the [World] Bank, and GATT were designed to help
the advanced industrial countries achieve the multiple objectives of full
employment, freer and expanding trade, and stable exchange rates.""o The
United Nations remained tied to all three organizations. Membership in the

reconstruction of the economy of members whose metropolitan territories have suffered great
devastation from enemy occupation or hostilities").
22 SUSAN A. AARONSON, TRADE AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF POSTWAR
TRADE POLICY 62 (Univ. Press of Kentucky 1996).

23 MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 2 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
24
25

id.
Note that members of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) were

referred to as "contracting parties." When the Charter for the ITO failed (see text at note 28),
the nation-states that ratified GATT 1947 refrained from referring to themselves as
"members" because no ITO organization actually existed. As a result, during the period of the
GATT prior to the establishment of the WTO, the "members" continued to refer to themselves
only as "contracting parties." When this comment uses the term "contracting parties,"
therefore, it refers to the members of GATT 1947 prior to the establishment of the WTO.
26
MATSUSHITA ETAL., supra note 23, at 2; see also JACKSON ETAL., supranote 15, at 219.
27

d

28

id.

JACKSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 219 ("The death of the ITO meant that GATT was, by
default, the central organization for coordinating national policies on international trade.").
30 Meier, supra note 16,
at 237.
29
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IMF and World Bank is contingent upon membership in the United
Nations.3 1 Although the GATT placed no similar requirement on its
contracting parties, it ensured that nothing in the GATT would "prevent any
contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace
and security."3 ' Thus, despite the fact that the global governance institutions
charged with managing conflicts between domestic national security policies
did not develop exactly as designed, the international community
nevertheless expected all four organizations to work collectively to govern
security threats in both the political and economic spheres.
B. The Evolution ofInstitutionalMission and the Division of
GovernanceArenas
Despite the intended interwoven nature of the global governance
institutions, the United Nations is now perceived as the only institution
charged with governing security issues. The IMF and World Bank are
thought to specialize in international development, and the GATT, having
expanded into the World Trade Organization, is charged with trade
liberalization. These missions are thought to be distinct and only the United
Nations is expected to intervene in national security situations. This current
conceptualization of compartmentalized global governance stems from the
unique history of each organization.
Originally, the IMF "was charged with preventing another global
depression" through collective action to maintain international security."
Over time, and particularly during the 1980s, the IMF began to expand its
mission.34 While the IMF was "supposed to limit itself to matters of
macroeconomics in dealing with a country," it defined the bounds of these
matters broadly, finding that "since almost any structural issue could affect
the overall performance of the economy, and hence the government's budget
or the trade deficit . . . almost everything [was] within its domain."" When

the Berlin Wall fell, the IMF further expanded its activities-finding a role
for itself in managing transition economies." As the IMF became
IMF members must be members of the United Nations. IMF Agreement, supra note 17, art.
11. World Bank members must be members of the IMF. World Bank Agreement, supra note
20, art. II, §1. Thus, members of the World Bank must also be members of the UN, as
membership in the IMF is contingent upon UN membership.
32 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI(c), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
33 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 12 (2002).
3
4Id. at 12-13.
35 Id. at 14.
31

36

d
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increasingly involved in shaping microeconomic policies, its actions began
to focus more on the internal development of nations rather than
international security.37 Eventually, the IMF was viewed as a development
arm of the United Nations, rather than as one of three pillars building a
foundation for United Nations security governance."
The evolving mission of the World Bank mirrors that of the iIF;
despite its inception as an institution actively engaged in security
governance, the World Bank is now largely viewed as a development
institution. For most of its history, the Bank's lending focused on
reconstruction projects. It was not until the 1980s that the World Bank
expanded its work to include structural adjustment loans aimed at providing
broad support to struggling economies.39 The structural adjustment loans
imposed market-oriented reform conditions on the borrowers.4 0 Within a
decade, the World Bank shifted these loan conditions from issues of
economics to issues of development generally, insisting that obtaining a
World Bank loan depended on proof of good governance or promises to
develop the institutions necessary to achieve good governance.4 The World
Bank even expanded its mission to include defining and monitoring good
governance for borrowing nations.42 Ultimately, the World Bank's actions
reformulated the common view of its mandate. The World Bank is now
thought to be charged with the development of "government agencies,
judiciaries, and legal frameworks . . . to secure meaningful movement
towards better governance" in Third World nations.4 3 Any understanding of
" Id. at 206-08.

This section only provides a brief synopsis of the mission shift which occurred in the IMF
during its organizational lifetime. For a full discussion of the "mission creep" phenomenon as
it plays out in the IMF, see generally STIGLITZ, supra note 33.
38

39
40

Id. at 14.

Id.

Amanda J. Perry, International Economic Organizations and the Modern Law and
Development Movement, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR
41

19, 22 (Ann Seidman, Robert B.
Seidman & Thomas W. Walde eds., 1999).
42 Id. at 22-23. Notably, the elements of good governance resemble the common
understanding of that phrase in western developed nations:
First, legal systems should provide 'a set of rules known in advance'
Secondly, legal systems should rely upon rules which are actually
implemented, and not just 'on the books.' Thirdly, legal systems should
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

ensure that rules are applied consistently to all

.

.

. Fourthly, the legal

system must provide an effective, independent mechanism for dispute
resolution. . . Fifthly, there must be clear rules to govern the amendment
of rules, to prevent the arbitrary introduction and rejection of rules, and to
clear out irrelevant rules.
Id. at 23.
4 Id.
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the World Bank as an institution with security governance responsibility has
evaporated.
Because the GATT was never intended to operate as an organization,"
many difficulties in implementation emerged. Ultimately, a growing
international consensus in favor of changing the GATT regime led to the
adoption of a World Trade Organization in 1994.45 The new World Trade
Organization (WTO) would manage the GATT, as well as several new
agreements regulating trade in services and intellectual property, among
other areas. 46 The late emergence of the WTO, as compared to the IMF and
World Bank, caused the WTO to never fully view itself as a third pillar of
the security governance foundation underlying the United Nations. Because
the GATT operated as a quasi-organization, but without the structure, staff,
or resources of its IMF and World Bank counterparts, it adopted a limited,
manageable focus on liberalizing trade in goods through the reduction of
tariff barriers.47 When the WTO emerged and provided an organizational
structure for trade liberalization, it made the elimination of non-tariff
barriers to trade part of its activities 48 but did not expand its agenda any
further, having long forgotten its intended role in global security governance.
The gradual shift in the mission of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO left
the United Nations the sole institution charged with security governance. As
such, when international conflict breaks out, the main mechanism for
checking the domestic discretion of sovereign nations is collective action
approved by the Security Council with its Chapter VII powers. 49 Nations rely
upon the ICJ as a secondary mechanism. As the principal United Nations
judicial organ,"o the ICJ is charged with adjudicating disputes between
nations regarding "the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation," and determining "the
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation."" Because the United Nations and the ICJ were not
intended to govern national security conflicts independently of the larger
See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
15, at 218-22.
46 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. II, Apr. 15, 1994,
33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Charter]. For a comprehensive introduction to all of the
WTO covered agreements, see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 15.
47 RORDEN WILKINSON, THE WTO: CRISIS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL TRADE 18
(2006).
48 JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 131 (2006) [hereinafter JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY].
49 CARTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 979.
44

45 JACKSON ET AL., supra note

5o

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter

ICJ Statute].
" Id. art. 36.
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international governance framework, their effectiveness has been limited,
especially in the area of enforcement.
C. Difficulties in Enforcement: The United Nations and the
InternationalCourt ofJustice
Although it is now seen as "the only organization with a global focus on
security, . . . in practice, the Security Council has a rather mixed record [in]
solv[ing] problems of global security."5 2 In particular, United Nations
members severely undermine the Security Council's authority by taking
unilateral action "whenever supportive to their national interests.""
Furthermore, conflicts between permanent members of the United Nations
cause stalemates in various United Nations organs, including the Security
Council.5 4 Both problems, unilateral action and Security Council stalemates,
reduce the legitimacy of United Nations processes and limit its ability to
adequately address questions of international security.
A specific institutional problem limiting the United Nations' ability to
enforce Security Council decisions is that, although the United Nations
Charter provides for the development of standing United Nations military
forces, none was ever created. United Nations Charter Article 43 creates a
mechanism by which United Nations member states would provide armed
forces to serve as a United Nations standing army." No United Nations

52 Emil J. Kirchner, Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional
Responses, in GLOBAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE: COMPETING PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN THE
21ST CENTURY 3, 13 (Emil J. Kirchner & James Sperling eds., 2007).

5 Id.

Id. at 13-14. Stalemates also occur in the other UN organs, including the First Main
Committee of the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the
Geneva Conference on Disarmament.
5 Article 43 states:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance
of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purposes of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces,
their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and
assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be conducted between the Security
Council and the Members or between the Security Council and groups of
Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
U.N. Charter art. 43.
54
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member concluded an Article 43 agreement with the Security Council,56
which has left the United Nations without the forces necessary to enforce its
decisions. To rectify this difficulty, the United Nations adopted an ad hoc
approach, authorizing states to come together in a "coalition of the willing"
in order to respond to specific security threats." This system of ad hoc
coalitions left nations feeling more in control of military enforcement actions
than the United Nations Charter intended."
United Nations enforcement faces further difficulty because its judicial
organ is not endowed with compulsory jurisdiction. Although the United
Nations Charter created the ICJ59 and requires all United Nations members to
join the court,60 the United Nations did not succeed in creating worldwide
compulsory jurisdiction.6 1 Instead, ICJ jurisdiction is based primarily upon
the consent of the parties.62 Consent may either be given on a case-by-case
basis or through a declaration accepting ICJ compulsory jurisdiction."
The issue of jurisdiction has been a significant factor in the
ineffectiveness of the ICJ. Because few nations submitted compulsory
jurisdiction declarations, ICJ jurisdiction is overwhelmingly subject to the
consent of the parties, resulting in only 125 cases coming before the court
during its fifty-seven years of existence.' Even when a nation has agreed to
compulsory jurisdiction, its compulsory jurisdiction declaration can be
modified or terminated." In fact, some states facing an adverse ICJ decision
respond by withdrawing their compulsory jurisdiction declaration rather than
implement the decision. The U.S. withdrawal after the adverse decision in
56 CARTER ET AL.,
57 THOMAS

M.

supra note 10, at 1027.

FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTIONS AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED

24-25 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
In particular, the United Nations faced difficulty in governing the Iraq situation after 1999.
CARTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1056-57. Ultimately, this culminated in the U.S. and United
Kingdom abandoning the United Nations process with respect to Iraq, concluding that "[t]he
" Id. at 1065
United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities
(quoting President George W. Bush).
59 U.N. Charter art. 92.
60 U.N. Charter art.
93.
ATTACKS
58

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Doha Development Round Negotiations on Improvements
and Clarificationsof the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding2001-2003: An Overview,
in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 3, 6 (Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich
61

Petersmann eds., 2004).
62 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
63 ICJ Statute, supra note 50, art.

§ 903 cmt. a (1996).

36.

64 CARTER ET AL.,

supra note 10, at 287.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
392, 1 61 (Nov. 26) (recognizing "the right to modify the contents of [a compulsory
jurisdiction declaration] or to terminate it, a power which is inherent in any unilateral act of a
State").
65
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the Nicaragua case is the most notable example of such behavior."
Furthermore, even when the ICJ issues a decision on the merits of a case, it
does not have the power to enforce its judgments, and a number of nations
have openly refused to comply with ICJ decisions.67 Although the Security
Council may take action to enforce ICJ judgments," because it has been
"hampered in part by its veto-wielding members, [the Security Council] has
yet to take [such] measures." 69 As a result of these difficulties, the ICJ "plays
only a marginal role for the settlement of mainly bilateral disputes."o
Although these enforcement difficulties lead some to opine that global
governance of national security issues has failed or is of limited value,' the
real difficulty lies in the forgotten role of the supplementary international
security governance institutions. The United Nations and the ICJ are, and
will continue to be, the main mechanisms for governing international
security conflicts, especially those involving the use of force.72 However, the
use of force is rarely the only tool used to advance national security
objectives. The WTO was designed to play the governance role in situations
where national security objectives are pursued via economic measures.

66

Letter from George P. Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State, to the U.N. Secretary General (Oct.

7, 1985), reprintedin 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
67 CARTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 288 (discussing a 1980 Iran refusal, the
U.S. 1986 refusal

in the Nicaragua case, and the refusal of the U.S. to comply with the Breard and LaGrand
cases in the 1990s). See also Ben White, Five Years After ICJ Ruling, Israel Expands its
Illegal Wall onto More PalestinianLand, WASH. REP. MIDDLE E. AFF., July 2009, available at

http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/articIe/1 63-general/48068-five-years-aftericj-ruling-israel-expands-its-illegal-wall-onto-more-palestinian-land.pdf,
BBC,
Q&A:
International Court of Justice, BBC NEWS, Feb. 26, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/europe/3879937.stm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (noting the 1977 Argentina-ChileBeagle
Channel case as an example of the ICJ's limited ability to enforce its decisions).
68 U.N. Charter art. 94, para.
2.
69 CARTER ET AL., supra note 10,
at 288.
70 Petersmann, supra note 61, at 5. I note that there is a wealth
of literature praising the
advances of the ICJ. I do not suggest that the ICJ has completely failed or that the WTO
dispute settlement system should replace the ICJ. The ICJ has a particularly successful record
with regard to territory and boundary dispute cases, for example. Rather, I suggest only that
the ICJ faces certain difficulties due to faults in its construction and implementation over
time, and that in cases involving economic aspects of the national security disputes, the WTO
can help fill the gap often left by the ICJ's inability to enforce its decisions. For a discussion
of ICJ successes, see MOHAMED SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AS THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 216 (Kluwer Law Int'l
2003).
7 Kirchner, supra note 52,
at 13.
72 Krahmann, American Hegemony, supra note 4, at
531 (quoting THE COMMISSION ON
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBALNEIGHBORHOOD 99 (1995)).
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II. THE WTO AND NATIONAL SECURITY: RELEVANT AGREEMENTS
AND UNIQUE FEATURES OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

The World Trade Organization (WTO) administers a variety of trade
agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The GATT contains several provisions that potentially limit WTO members'
ability to adopt restrictive trade measures for the purpose of furthering
national security objectives. In fact, challenges to such measures have been
brought before the WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) on a variety of
occasions.7 3 The WTO, however, has refused to reach the merits of any case
involving measures taken for national security purposes.74 This refusal stems
from controversy surrounding the interpretation of the GATT exception for
national security measures." This result is unfortunate, given the uniquely
successful dispute settlement system developed by the WTO. The
compulsory jurisdiction of the WTO, the high rate of compliance, and the
unique enforcement mechanisms available to the WTO DSS weigh in favor
of the WTO casting aside the concerns surrounding the national security
exception and instead reaching the merits of such cases.
A. Basic WTO ObligationsRelevant to NationalSecurity
Domestic measures adopted in the name of national security could
conceivably implicate many WTO covered agreements," but the agreement
historically invoked in this context is the GATT.77 Historically speaking,
73 See infra Part

II.A.

id.
71 See infra Part II.B.

74

For example, an action to block financial transactions might be challenged under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, which specifically requires "each Member [to]
accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers
of any other country." General Agreement on Trade in Services art. II, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lB, Legal
Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property might also be invoked to
combat a measure undertaken in the name of national security; the U.S. compulsory license
for anthrax during the anthrax attacks on Congress, for example, might have been challenged
under the TRIPS compulsory license scheme encompassed under Articles 28-31. Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property arts. 28-31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Due to
space considerations and the historical reality that measures have, to date, only been
challenged under GATT, this comment restricts its focus to that agreement.
77 The GATT was at the center of each of the four disputes regarding national security
measures brought to the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system to date. See Contracting
Parties Decision, Article XXI-United States Export Restrictions, CP.3/SR22 (June 8, 1949),
76

InternationalGovernance ofDomestic NationalSecurity

545
545

nations recurrently resort to economic sanctions as a tool of international
conflict." Notably, total embargoes and selective export and import controls
are among the most common measures unilaterally undertaken during
international conflict." Export controls, for example, are strategically used
to limit another country's effective use of its military."o In undertaking such
economic sanctions, the country adopting the measure must be cognizant of
its GATT obligations, specifically the rules relating to most-favored-nation
treatment, national treatment, and quantitative restrictions.
The GATT regulations concerning most-favored-nation treatment,
national treatment, and quantitative restrictions are found in Articles I, III,
and XI. GATT Article I requires that customs duties and charges levied on
the exports and imports of one WTO member be no less favorable than those
levied on the like exports and imports of any other country." This provision,
commonly referred to as the most-favored-nation provision, limits WTO
members' ability to impose export restrictions to further national security
objectives. GATT Article III imposes an obligation upon WTO members to
refrain from adopting laws and regulations that treat products of other WTO

GATT B.I.S.D. (2nd Supp.) at 28; Contracting Parties Decision, Article XXI-United States
Export Restrictions, GATT B.I.S.D. (2nd Supp.) at 36 (May 1952); Report of the Panel,
United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted)

[hereinafter U.S. -Nicaragua]; Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/2

(Oct. 4, 1996).
78 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMic LAw 925 (John H. Jackson ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2008) ("Well before the UN Security Council began to use economic
sanctions as a primary tool, individual countries used economic sanctions as an important
instrument of foreign policy, less dangerous than military force, but more serious - and
sometimes more effective - than diplomacy alone.").
7 Id. at 926. Note that at this juncture, the use of the term "international conflict" is meant to
encompass both international situations which might escalate to war, and war itself.
80 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 23, at 217 (describing two common goals of export controls
as "limit[ing] the military or economic capability of another country; and . . sanction[ing] a
country or induc[ing] it to change its policies").
81 GATT, supra note 32, art. 1. Specifically, Article I provides:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties.
Id. art. 1(1).
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members less favorably than similar domestic products.8 2 Thus, this Article
limits WTO members' ability to enact many common forms of import
controls used to further national security objectives. Article XI is a
"prohibition on quantitative restrictions." This prohibition applies to all
measures, whether affecting imports or exports.84 Any embargo or
prohibition would be facially inconsistent with this provision." Each of
these GATT obligations represents an opportunity for WTO governance of
security issues."
In the relatively few disputes that have arisen relating to measures
undertaken for the purposes of national security, each involved one or more
of these three GATT articles." The GATT and WTO dispute settlement
82

GATT, supra note 32, art. III. The text of the provision specifically requires that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied directly or
indirectly, to like domestic products....

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws and
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.
Id. arts. 111(2), 111(4).
83 LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 916. Article XI reads, in pertinent part:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale
for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.

GATT, supra note 32, art. XI(1).
84 Report of the Panel, Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors,
GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 116 (1988).
85 LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 916.

104, L/6309 (May 4, 1988),

A WTO panel has jurisdiction over any dispute arising under one of the WTO covered
agreements, such as the GATT. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1226 art.
23.1 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. When this comment refers to a WTO panel hearing on a
national security dispute, it refers to a panel hearing on a dispute implicating one of the
covered agreements and suggests that such a dispute will represent only the economic
measures undertaken by a nation-state as part of a larger international security situation, other
aspects of which may be addressed by the United Nations.
86

In addition to the disputes discussed infra, a fifth dispute involving the European
Community ("EC") and Yugoslavia was also brought before the GATT contracting parties.
87

Communication from the European Communities, Trade Measures Taken by the European
Community Against the SocialistFederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, GATT Doc. L/6948 (Dec. 2,

1991), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/91600060.pdf. The
European Community defended on national security grounds. Id. at 1. The case was
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panels, however, have consistently refused to issue findings on the merits,
preferring instead to avoid national security issues. For example, in 1948,
Czechoslovakia challenged export restrictions imposed by the U.S. against it
during the Cold War as a violation of Articles XI(1) and XII." This
complaint came to the fledgling GATT before dispute settlement procedures
were in place, and the complaint was summarily rejected." When Argentina
invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982, the European Community imposed an
embargo on Argentinean imports.90 Argentina filed a complaint against the
European Community, alleging a violation of Articles I and XI(l)." The
embargo was suspended shortly after the complaint was filed, and the case
never proceeded to the merits. 2
The case in which a panel came closest to findings on the merits
involved the U.S.-Nicaragua controversy of the 1980s. 3 In 1985, as part of
its overall opposition to the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, the U.S.
instituted "a total embargo against trade with Nicaragua."94 In explaining the
rationale behind the measure, the U.S. President relied on the "unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United

suspended on procedural grounds and is not discussed at length here. For further discussion of
this case, see Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, "Constitutionalization" and Dispute
Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 424,

436 (1999).
supra note 78, at 918 (citing Contracting Parties Decision, Article XXIUnited States Exports Restrictions, CP.3/SR22 (June 8, 1949), GATT B.I.S.D. (2nd Supp.) at

88 LOWENFELD,

28 (1952)).

Id. (describing how the contracting parties reject the complaint by vote in a normal
session). As GATT dispute settlement procedures developed, the U.S. proactively sought a
waiver of the most-favored-nation obligation with respect to Czechoslovakia to supplement
its efforts against communism during the Cold War. Id. at 919. The GATT contracting parties
adopted a declaration allowing the two countries to mutually suspend trade concessions with
regard to the other. Id. (citing Declaration of 27 Sept. 1951: Suspension of Obligations
between Czechoslovakia and the U.S. under the Agreement, GATT B.I.S.D. (2nd Supp.) at 36
(1952)).
89

90 Id.

91Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons, GATT Doc.
L/5317 (Apr. 30, 1982).
92 LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 920.
9 This comment focuses its discussion on the case referred to in the GATT jurisprudence as
Nicaragua II, involving the U.S. embargo against Nicaragua. This case was preceded by
Nicaragua I, which involved a challenge to the U.S. reduction in Nicaraguan sugar quota.
Report of the Panel, UnitedStates-Imports of Sugarfrom Nicaragua,1 3.1, L/5607 (Mar. 13,

1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 67, 72 (1985). In that case, the U.S. essentially did not
submit any arguments on the merits but focused solely on jurisdictional issues. See
Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 87, at 433-34. As a result, it is of less value for the
purposes of this comment and will not be further discussed here.
94 LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 922 (citing Exec. Order No. 12513, 31 C.F.R. 540 (May 10,
1985)).
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States and . . . declare[d] a national emergency to deal with that threat." 5

Nicaragua challenged the embargo under the GATT, alleging violations of
Articles I(1) and XI(1), among others.96 Although a GATT panel was
established to hear the dispute, it side-stepped any actual decision on the
merits and merely commented that "the GATT could not achieve its basic
aims unless each contracting party, whenever it made use of [measures
undertaken to further national security objectives], carefully weighed its
security needs against the need to maintain stable trade relations."97
The only national-security-related dispute to come before a WTO panel,
rather than a GATT dispute proceeding, involved the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, generally referred to as the
Helms-Burton Act." The Helms-Burton Act achieved two objectives: first, it
codified economic sanctions imposed on Cuba via executive orders, and
second, it created liability for persons and companies of third-party countries
that conducted business with Cuba and traded in property confiscated from
U.S. nationals.99 The evident purpose underlying the Helms-Burton Act "was
to deter persons and companies that did business with the United States from
doing business with Cuba-a classical secondary boycott."'o The European
Community, among others, was incensed by what was perceived as another
U.S. attempt to extend its powers to regulate conduct extraterritorially."o
The European Commission drafted a regulation preventing compliance with
the Helms-Burton Act,'02 and the European Community filed a complaint in
the WTO, alleging that the Helms-Burton Act violated GATT Articles I, III,
and XI, among others.'03 Because the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
had compulsory jurisdiction, unlike under the prior GATT 1947 system,'04 it
9 Id.

U.S. Nicaragua,supra note 77, 1 4.3.
U.S. Nicaragua,supra note 77, 5.16. The failure to reach a final determination caused the
dispute to remain ongoing until Nicaragua withdrew the complaint in 1990, after the
Sandinistas lost power and the U.S. repealed the embargo. LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 922
96
9

(citing Communication from Nicaragua, United States-Trade Measures Against Nicaragua,

GATT Doc. L/6661 (Mar. 23, 1990), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/
English/SULPDF/91490156.pdf).
98 Cuban Libertad and Democratic Solidarity Act, Pub. L. No. 104-14, 110 Stat. 785 (1996).
99 LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 923; Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 87, at 426.
100 LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 923.
Rene E. Browne, Note, Revisiting "National Security" in an Interdependent World: The
GATTArticle XYI Defense After Helms-Burton, 86 GEO. L.J. 405, 406-07 (1997).
102 LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 924.
101

103 Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 87, at 430. The European Community also raised
claims that the Helms Burton Act was inconsistent with the GATS.
104 See DSU, supra note 86, art. 23.1. It is also notable that the terms of reference (the scope
of a panel's duties and powers when adjudicating a dispute) had been standardized at this
point. Id. art. 7 (describing the standard terms of reference given to each panel). In the U.S.-
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appeared that the WTO would finally rule on the validity of a measure
related to national security concerns.' 5 Instead, the European Community
and the U.S. settled the dispute.
This review of GATT/WTO jurisprudence on measures undertaken to
further national security objectives reveals that the WTO has refused to
fulfill its role as a pillar of international security by sidestepping the most
significant security issues to come before it. GATT Articles I, III, and XI
give the WTO direct governance authority over the types of economic
measures most likely to be undertaken in the name of national security. The
drafters of the GATT believed they were negotiating an agreement to be
administered by an International Trade Organization whose goal was to aid
the United Nations and its judicial organ, the International Court of Justice,
in maintaining international security. Although the historical evolution of the
WTO has alienated WTO practice from its original mission of security
governance, its mandate has not changed, and the WTO can and should use
its governance authority to create a more effective international security
governance regime by addressing the merits of security cases.
B. The National Security Exception
Part of the explanation for the DSB's failure to rule on the merits of any
dispute involving the domestic national security of WTO members stems
from another provision within the GATT. Although the GATT prohibits
certain restrictive trade measures frequently used to advance national
security interests, GATT Article XXI also contains an exception clause
specifically for such measures.o6 As such, if a WTO member meets the
Nicaragua dispute, the panel was given limited terms of reference, which rendered it unable
to judge the validity of the U.S.' motivation for the measure. U.S.-Nicaragua, supra note 77,
5.3. This requirement in the terms of reference reflects the differing views of the GATT
contracting parties as to the scope of the national security exception contained in GATT
Article XXI. For a discussion of Article XXI, see infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
105Browne, supra note 101, at 408.
06.
GATT Article XXI, the national security exception, states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived;
(ii.) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and
to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii.) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
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requirements of Article XXI, an otherwise invalid trade measure may be
valid. Every invocation of Article XXI has been controversial. Namely, there
is disagreement about whether the Article contains objective requirements
for its applicability in the same way as GATT Article XX (the general
exceptions clause), or whether a WTO member's subjective claim of
national security interest is sufficient to excuse an otherwise invalid trade
measure. 107
Although the national security exception, on its face, confines its use to
five possible situations (disclosure of national security secrets, actions
relating to fissionable materials, actions relating to the trafficking of arms
and other military goods, circumstances of war or emergency, and Security
Council-mandated action),"o' concern that the exception would be abused has
remained.109 In that regard, when the national security exception was
discussed during the first U.S.-Czechoslovakia GATT dispute,' the GATT
contracting parties noted that "every country must have the last resort on
questions relating to its own security. On the other hand, the contracting
parties should be cautious not to take any step which might have the effect of
undermining the General Agreement.""' In other words, the question
remained whether the contracting parties possessed the power to decide,
based on an objective assessment of the record, whether one of the five
situations enumerated in Article XXI existed or whether the contracting
parties must accept the subjective claim of one country that the preconditions for invoking the exception had been satisfied.
The U.S. and the European Community were the two parties that voiced
the loudest support for the idea that the contracting parties must accept a
claim of national security interests without conducting an independent
review of the record. The European Community position, according to its
ambassador to the GATT, was that "it is not the role of GATT to resolve
disputes in the field of national security."" 2 Similarly, in the 1985 U.S.(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
GATT, supra note 32, art. XXI. Notably the GATS and TRIPS agreements contain exceptions
clauses virtually identical to GATT XXI. See GATS, supra note 76, art. XIV bis; TRIPS,
supra note 76, art. 73.
107 See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
108 GATT, supra note 32, art. XXI.
109 JACKSON, LAW OF GATT, supra note 90, at 748-52.
110 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.

" Contracting Parties Decision, Article XXI - United States Exports Restrictions,
CP.3/SR.22, at 7 (June 8, 1949), GATT B.I.S.D. (2nd Supp.) at 28, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/49expres.pdf.
112 JACKSON ETAL., supra note 15, at 1081 (quoting the U.S. ambassador to the GATT).
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Nicaragua GATT dispute, the U.S. explicitly invoked GATT Article XXI,
arguing that such use of the provision rendered the GATT dispute settlement
system unable "to question, approve, or disapprove the judgment of each
Contracting Party as to what is necessary to protect its national security
interests."" 3 Because of its limited terms of reference in adjudicating the
dispute, the panel declined to decide the matter but instead recommended
that the GATT Council consider several general questions:
If it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was
reserved entirely to the contracting party invoking it, how could the
Contracting Parties ensure that this general exception to all
obligations under the General Agreement is not invoked excessively
or for purposes other than those set out in this provision? If the
Contracting Parties give a panel the task of examining a case
involving an Article XXI invocation without authorizing it to
examine the justification of that provision, do they limit the
adversely affected contracting party's right to have its complaint
investigated ... ? I1
The first U.S.-Czechoslovakia GATT dispute and the 1985 U.S.-Nicaragua
GATT dispute represent the only opportunities in GATT/WTO
jurisprudence for the DSB to interpret GATT Article XXI."' In both
instances, the panels declined to do so.
The resulting tension and ambiguity surrounding the national security
exception caused the contracting parties to adopt a Decision Concerning
Article XXI of the General Agreement, requiring any party invoking the
exception in the future to provide notice to the GATT Council."' This
decision noted that although the national security exceptions "constitute an
important element for safeguarding the rights of Contracting Parties when
they consider that reasons of security are involved . .. recourse to Article

XXI could constitute, in certain circumstances, an element of disruption and
uncertainty for international trade.""' The decision did not offer an
interpretation of GATT Article XXI as to the objective/subjective issue. As a
result, the issue remains "whether the subsections of the Article have
objective content or present open-ended exceptions that can be invoked
113 Id.

U.S.-Nicaragua,supra note 77, 1 5.17.
115 Outside of an actual dispute panel, in the EC-Argentina controversy (see supra notes 8587 and accompanying text), Argentina sought an interpretation of Article XXI for six months
after the embargo was lifted. The GATT Council declined the invitation. LOWENFELD, supra
note 78, at 920.
116 Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, GATT Doc. L/5426
1 (Dec.
2, 1982), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt-docs/English/SULPDF/91000212.pdf.
114

"' Id. at pmbl.
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unilaterally."'" In other words, no WTO jurisprudence definitively indicates
whether the national security exception is limited to instances where one of
the five situations listed in the text of the article exists as identified by
objective criteria set forth by the DSB (as is the case with the GATT Article
XX exceptions, for example) or whether the DSB must simply accept a
WTO member's invocation of GATT Article XXI without further inquiry, as
the U.S. and EC have consistently claimed.
In order for the WTO to fulfill its mandate as the third pillar of
international governance supporting United Nations action in security
governance, GATT Article XXI must possess objective content. The two
main concerns preventing prior panels from giving Article XXI objective
content include: (1) that doing so would be controversial and difficult, and
(2) that the GATT Contracting Parties would not accept the decision and
back out of the 1947 GATT Agreement." 9 Since the creation of the WTO,
however, advances in the DSS and in WTO jurisprudence render these
concerns insufficient to justify continued refusal to interpret GATT Article
XXI as requiring an objective showing.
C. Success in Enforcement: Unique Featuresof the WTO Dispute
Settlement System
The WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) "has been described as the
most important and most powerful of any international law tribunal."' 20
Several aspects of the DSS that make it unique among international courts
have contributed to this claim of importance and stature. First, the DSS has
compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising under the WTO-covered
agreements. Second, decisions issued by DSS panels or the Appellate Body
enjoy a high rate of compliance. Third, even where WTO members disagree
with a panel or Appellate Body ruling, members typically seek redress
within the WTO system, rather than withdrawing from the WTO altogether.
These three aspects of the DSS are of particular importance to global
governance of domestic national security measures because they help avoid
the three main difficulties faced by the ICJ and provide the WTO an
opportunity to make an important contribution toward its forgotten role of
securing peace through economic stability and non-discrimination. These
three aspects of the DSS also render the prior excuses for avoiding the merits
of security cases moot.

118 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 23, at 221.
119 LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 916; see also infra notes
120 JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY,supra note 48, at 135.

172-74 and accompanying text.

InternationalGovernance ofDomestic NationalSecurity

553

One of the "birth defects" of the GATT system, corrected by the
Contracting Parties during the Uruguay Round of negotiations that created
the WTO, was that the lack of concrete dispute settlement rules in GATT
Article XXIII allowed losing parties to block council decisions and thereby
avoid accountability.'"' The Uruguay Round of negotiations resolved this
deficiency by providing for compulsory jurisdiction.'2 2 The Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU), which contains the binding DSS rules and
procedures, provides in Article 23.1 that "[w]hen Members seek the redress
of a violation of obligations . . . under the covered agreements . . . they shall

have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this
Understanding." 23 The U.S.-Section 301 case held that DSU Article 23.1
constitutes a compulsory jurisdiction provision.124 The Appellate Body has
held that its duty to hear a complaint as a result of this compulsory
jurisdiction provision cannot be nullified or impaired, even if another
international adjudicatory body is seized of the same issue.125
Compulsory jurisdiction would be meaningless, however, if WTO
members refused to comply with DSS decisions and the DSS lacked
enforcement power. Notably, WTO members comply with DSS rulings
eighty percent of the time.' 26 In those cases in which WTO members try to
121JACKSON ET AL., supra note

15, at 266-67; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 23, at 4.
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court": Some
PersonalExperiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization,in
122

THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003, 499, 501 (Federico Ortino & ErnstUlrich Petersmann eds., 2004) ("Since the entry into force of the Marrakesh Agreement,
dispute settlement has become a matter of compulsory jurisdiction for all WTO Members.").
123 DSU, supra note 86,
art. 23.1.
124

Panel Report, United States-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,

7.43,

WT/DS152/R (Jan. 27, 2000).
25

Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages,

WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006). This is also in accordance with DSU Article 3.2, which
provides that Panels or the Appellate Body may not add to or diminish the rights of members
under the covered agreements. DSU, supra note 86, art. 3.2. WTO members consider the
compulsory jurisdiction of the DSS to be one of their rights, the right to be heard, under the
covered agreements. Additionally, it should be noted that DSU Article 7 standardizes panel
terms of reference, rectifying the loophole that prevented the contracting parties from ruling
on the merits in the U.S.-Nicaraguaproceedings. See DSU, supra note 86.
126 Sharyn O'Halloran, US Implementation of WTO Decisions, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE,
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 945, 946 (Merit E. Janow, Victoria
Donaldson & Alan Yanovich eds., 2008); see also Werner Zdouc, Features of the Appellate
Body That Have Defined its Performance, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
& DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra, at 369, 381 ("In most cases, the losing party attempts to
accomplish what it perceives to be full implementation and takes measures to comply with the
DSB recommendations and rulings."); Gary Horlick & Judith Colemann, A Comment on
Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra, at 771 ("WTO Members normally comply
with their WTO obligations.").
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avoid compliance with an adverse ruling, however, the DSS possesses the
power to enforce its decisions under DSU Articles 21 and 22.127 Generally
speaking, if the panel and Appellate Body recommendations are not
implemented, Article 22 allows the winning party to seek compensation
from the losing party.128 If the parties cannot agree to an appropriate level of
compensation, the winning party can seek an official finding of noncompliance from the DSS and receive permission to suspend certain WTO
obligations with respect to the non-complying member (termed retaliation or
'cross-retaliation,' depending on the obligations suspended). 129 The purpose
of these enforcement mechanisms is always to induce the non-compliant
member to withdraw its measure.' Notably, in one study of 101 completed
WTO cases, "retaliation was requested in only seven cases . . . and

authorized by the DSB in only six cases (in one case, the WTO-inconsistent
measure was withdrawn soon after the arbitration was completed, thus
obviating the need for final DSB authorization of retaliation).""' In two of
those six cases, the retaliation led to the withdrawal of the contested
measure.'32 A third case led to amendments to the contested measure,"' and
the parties to the other three disputes opted to attempt settlement
negotiations rather than actually impose retaliatory measures.'34 Ultimately,
then, the compensation and retaliation enforcement mechanisms of the DSU

127

See DSU, supra note 86, arts. 21-22. For an in-depth discussion of the operation of these

articles, see PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES & MATERIALS (2005).
128 DSU, supra note 86, art. 22.1.
129 Id. art. 22.2. For more on retaliation and cross-retaliation, see JACKSON
ET AL., supra note

15, at 348.
130 Delphine de Mey, The Effect of WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings in the EC Legal Order:
Reviewing Van Parys v. Belgishce Interventie-en Restitutiebureau (C-377/02), 6 GERMAN L.J.
1025, 1027 (2005).
131 Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement
Rulings, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra
note 126, at 777, 779.
132

Id. at 781-82. The two cases referenced are: Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax

Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations', WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), and
Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/AB/R & WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
13 Wilson, supra note 131, at 781. The case referenced is Appellate Body Report, European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R &
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
134 Wilson, supra note 131, at 781-82. The three cases referred to are: Appellate Body Report,
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 25, 1997), Appellate Body Report, Canada-Aircraft Subsidies,
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 20, 1999), and Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Aircraft Subsidies,
WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 20, 1999).
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are effective in achieving the aim of WTO dispute settlement: to bring the
non-compliant parties into compliance with WTO obligations.
The third and final element of the WTO that makes it uniquely effective
is that even when a member does not wish to implement a panel or Appellate
Body ruling, the member seeks redress within the DSS, rather than
withdrawing from the WTO altogether. A member may withdraw from the
WTO upon six months' written notice.' 35 Even in the most contested dispute,
which concerned the European Community banana import regime, however,
the losing party did not make use of this provision. A group of Latin
American countries brought two different challenges to the EC banana
import regime under GATT 1947, but the EC blocked the adoption of both
panel reports.136 When the DSS became operative, the U.S., Mexico,
Ecuador, Honduras, and Guatemala instigated a third challenge, ECBananasIII, in 1996.'17 The WTO panel found in favor of the U.S., and the
European Community mounted an unsuccessful appeal.' As a result, the
European Community made slight changes to the import regime. Believing
such changes failed to make the regime WTO-compliant, Ecuador initiated
compliance proceedings in 1998.139 The European Community faced several
more compliance panel proceedings before reaching an agreement on an
appropriate banana import regime in 2001.140
Despite the European Community's obvious disagreement with the
results of the successive Bananas dispute settlement procedures, the
European Community continued to press its defense within the WTO
governance system rather than withdraw. Although some banana-producing
countries in the Caribbean became so frustrated with the EC-Bananas III
dispute that they threatened to withdraw from the WTO, they never carried
out the threat. 14 1 In fact, in 2008, further WTO dispute settlement
proceedings were held regarding this dispute, as the parties seek a global
governance resolution rather than withdrawal and unilateralism.142 This can

135
136

GATT, supra note 32, art. XXXI.

Bruce R. Hirsh, The WTO Bananas Decision: Cutting Through the Thicket, 11 LEIDEN J.

INT'LL. 201, 202 (1998).
37
1 Id. at 205.
138 Id.
1
Report

of the Panel, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador, 1.2, WT/DS27/RW/ECU

(Apr. 12, 1999).
140 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas Notification ofa Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS27/58 (July 2, 2001).
141VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supranote 127, at 119.
142 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regimefor the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas - Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador and
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU,
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be attributed in large part to the fact that, unlike the United Nations and ICJ,
a WTO member cannot remain a party to the covered agreements while
simultaneously withdrawing from the DSS. The Dispute Settlement
Understanding is a part of the overall WTO agreement framework to which
each WTO member must be a signatory. Thus, for a WTO member to reject
the jurisdiction of the WTO DSS, it would have to withdraw entirely from
the WTO; while possible, such withdrawal would mean the forfeiture of
important trade preferences. By inextricably linking the DSS to the trade
preferences in the other agreements, the WTO ensured that its compulsory
jurisdiction provision was given the teeth necessary to remain intact.
Three unique elements of the WTO dispute settlement system perfectly
situate the WTO to fill the international security governance gap left by the
enforcement difficulties of the United Nations and the ICJ: compulsory
jurisdiction, enforcement mechanisms leading to high levels of compliance,
and the fact that WTO members choose to resolve disagreements about
disputes within the DSS itself rather than through withdrawal. These three
aspects of the WTO system directly mirror the three reasons often cited for
the ICJ's enforcement failures: consent-based jurisdiction, lack of
enforcement mechanisms, and the tendency of member states to simply
withdraw jurisdiction rather than to continue to resolve the dispute in the
United Nations system. The fact that these unique features of the WTO DSS
fill the gaps left by the ICJ reveals an important reason why the WTO should
assume the role for which it was originally designed and act as co-governor
of national security conflicts. An examination of the Nicaraguacase shows
that these three unique features of the WTO DSS alleviate the concerns that
have prevented panels from addressing the merits of security cases in the
past.

III. EXAMINING

THE POSSIBILITIES WITH A HISTORICAL EXAMPLE:
THE NICARAGUA CASE

The WTO was created to be an active participant in the governance of
international security issues and was given governance powers to
supplement those of the United Nations. The Cold War rendered the United
Nations Security Council less effective because of the ongoing conflict
between two veto-holding members. The WTO supplementary governance
powers were designed precisely for such situations-when the Security
Council cannot act because of internal politics or because the situation is
beyond its reach. When the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua, the tiny
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA (Nov. 26, 2008).
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Central American nation found itself the object of intense U.S. action against
suspected communists. Nicaragua fought the actions of the U.S. through the
international security governance system, asking the ICJ to rule the military
activity instigated by the U.S. inside Nicaragua illegal under international
law, and simultaneously asking the GATT Contracting Parties to rule the
U.S. embargo against Nicaragua a violation of GATT obligations.
Unfortunately for Nicaragua, it won on the merits in the forum lacking
enforcement power, while the forum with the most power to enforce its
decisions avoided the issue. While commentators argue that such evasion of
controversial national security issues was necessary under the GATT regime,
history has undermined the foundations of those critiques. As a result, the
WTO should exercise its authority over national-security-related measures
and fulfill its forgotten role in the international security governance system.
A. Nicaraguain the InternationalCourt ofJustice
During the Cold War, the U.S. pursued national security objectives by
opposing leftist regimes. Thus, when the Sandinista regime came to power in
Nicaragua in 1979,143 the U.S. brought its might to bear upon the small
Central American nation. The U.S. strategy for ousting the Sandinistas
contained two parts: (1) support military and paramilitary activity against the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and (2) isolate the regime through economic
sanctions.'4 Refusing to become a victim of the Cold War, Nicaragua
proactively sought a remedy for the military activity pursued by the U.S. in
the International Court of Justice. While Nicaragua succeeded on the merits,
the ICJ remained powerless to enforce its judgment, and the U.S. continued
to sponsor military operations within Nicaraguan borders. In this way, the
Nicaragua case before the ICJ provides an example of one of the two
situations for which the WTO's supplementary international security
governance was designed to play a role: dispute resolution when the ICJ
cannot enforce its judgments because politics within the Security Council
prevents the adoption of a resolution to provide such enforcement.
In April of 1984, Nicaragua filed a complaint with the ICJ alleging that
the U.S. was
using military force against Nicaragua
Nicaragua's internal affairs.

. .

and intervening

in

. The United States has created an

.army' of more than 10,000 mercenaries .. . installed them in more
than ten base camps in Honduras along the border with Nicaragua,
Manus I. Midlarsky & Kenneth Roberts, Class, State, and Revolution in CentralAmerica:
Nicaraguaand El Salvador Compared, 29 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 163, 180 (1985).
'" William D. Rogers, The United States and Latin America, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 560, 563
(1984).
143
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trained them, paid them, supplied them with arms, ammunition, food
and medical supplies, and directed their attacks against human and
economic targets inside Nicaragua.145
Anticipating the suit from Nicaragua, the U.S. attempted to alter its
declaration of acceptance of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction by excluding from
its bounds any cases involving Central American states.'46 Although the U.S.
retained the right to alter its declaration on compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, it
had stipulated that any such change would only take effect after six months'
notice. 4 7 Nicaragua filed its complaint before that six-month window had
closed, and the ICJ ruled that it retained jurisdiction over the dispute. 4 8 The
U.S. disagreed so strongly with the holding that it refused to participate in
any further proceedings of the case.149 One year after the ICJ ruled that it had
jurisdiction to hear Nicaragua's complaint, and while the case continued to
proceed on the merits, the U.S. withdrew its acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction altogether.'
The ICJ issued a ruling on the merits of Nicaragua's claim in 1986,
finding the U.S. in violation of customary international law for "training,
arming, equipping, financing, and supplying the contra forces.""' The U.S.,
however, did not alter its activities in Nicaragua.' Nicaragua sought a
damages judgment from the ICJ, while the U.S. continued to abstain from
the proceedings.' The damages proceedings ended when a new regime was
elected to power in 1990, and Nicaragua withdrew the action in 1991.'4
As the ICJ's first effective interpretation of key aspects of the United
Nations Charter, " the Nicaraguacase set the tone for the court's future. The
Application Instituting Proceedings: Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 Gen. List No. 70 I.C.J. 2 (Apr. 9), availableat
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/70/9615.pdfPHPSESSID=05fad554ae9feec6f32e8fcea282
db53.
146 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
392 (Nov. 26).
147 Id.
13, 6 1.
145

48

1

Id. 65.

149 U.S. Dep't of State, Statement on the U.S. Withdrawalfrom the Proceedings Initiated by

Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 246

(1985).
1so Letter from George P. Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State, to the U.N. Secretary General, Oct.
7, 1984, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
'5' Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 146 (June 27).
152 CARTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 308.
1
154

Id.
Id

. Louis HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 47 &
n.22 (1991) (noting that "[t]he court concluded that it could not decide the case under the
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Its lack of worldwide compulsory
jurisdiction, its inability to enforce judgments, and United Nations members'
ability to simply withdraw from jurisdiction without other ramifications after
having consented to a partially compulsory regime has resulted in the
systemic lack of results exemplified in the Nicaragua case. One study
seeking to improve the ICJ noted that "the basic barrier to increased
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction lies in State attitudes."'" One possible
reason states' attitudes toward the ICJ have not allowed the ICJ to act as the
sole arbiter of international disputes regarding national security issues is that
the ICJ was never intended to act as the sole arbiter. Instead, its work was to
be supplemented by other institutions, such as the WTO. Nicaragua seemed
to have insight into the WTO's potential in supplementary security
governance and, while seeking redress in the ICJ, simultaneously sought a
remedy under the GATT dispute settlement procedures.
B. Nicaraguaand the GATT: Do the Reasonsfor Withholding a
Decision Remain Tenable in the WTO Context?
Nicaragua brought a challenge to the U.S. embargo under the GATT
dispute settlement procedures; however, as had become its custom in
disputes concerning national security measures, the GATT avoided any
decision on the issue.'" One of the reasons suggested for the GATT/WTO
refusal to decide disputes concerning national security matters is that the
original attempts to bring such issues before the trade dispute settlement
system were done during the era of the GATT, which was a fragile
organization.'" The Contracting Parties feared that if the GATT involved
itself in such disputes, it might lose what little coherence it possessed, along
with the support of its most vital member, the U.S.160 As one scholar
explains, "the infant GATT had neither the capacity nor the prestige to
undertake a serious examination" of national security measures. 6'
After reviewing this history, some commentators have concluded that
"[s]o long as the measures do not appear to be disguised efforts at economic

Charter because of a reservation by the United States, and would therefore decide it only
under customary international law. But the Court held that customary law and the law of the
Charter were essentially congruent in relevant respects, in effect construing the Charter.").
5 CARTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 287.
D. W. Bowett et al., The International Court of Justice: Efficiency of Procedures and
Working Methods, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. Sl, S22 (Supp. 1996).
157

158 For a full discussion of the case, see
1 LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 916.
160

id

161ROBERT

1990).

E.

HUDEC, THE

GATT

supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
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protectionism, the consensus has been that the GATT/WTO system is not the
appropriate forum for resolving controversies about trade controls for
political ends." 6 2 The claim that the WTO DSS is not the proper forum for
determining the validity of national security measures stems from the
argument, often raised by the U.S. and the European Community during the
GATT era, that GATT Article XXI is a self-judging exception, under which
each WTO member gets to decide for itself whether its measure satisfies the
exception.16 Although these theories suffice to explain the historical GATT
refusal to decide disputes related to national security measures, they are
insufficient reasons for the WTO to continue such a practice.
In fact, each of the explanations of the GATT's refusal to decide
national security disputes can be refuted in light of the current WTO
organization and jurisprudence. First, while the GATT may have been a
fragile organization weakened by the failure of the International Trade
Organization, the structure of the WTO was specifically designed to rectify
those shortcomings. Notably, the DSS is now widely regarded as the most
powerful international court.164 Its worldwide compulsory jurisdiction
extends to all disputes that come under WTO covered agreements, even
those involving national security measures. To support the idea that so long
as the measure is not disguised protectionism, the WTO is not the proper
forum for hearing a dispute regarding the measure "is to implicitly endorse
the security exceptions as a legitimate means of concealing illegitimate trade
measures." 6' For precisely this reason, the idea that Article XXI is selfjudging is now untenable because "GATT rules are not designed to be selfjudging, and unilateral action is specifically excluded in the Dispute
Settlement Understanding."' 66
Furthermore, the fact that the exercise of WTO authority over a disputed
measure is controversial has not prevented the WTO DSS from evaluating
claims that certain measures fall within exceptions for protecting public
morals, protecting the environment, or other controversial issues of domestic
importance to members. For example, when the U.S. defended a measure
based on the Article XX exception for protecting the environment, the
Appellate Body gave Article XX objective content and, therefore, gave itself
the authority to evaluate the U.S.'s proposed justification for the measure. 167
LOWENFELD, supra note 78, at 926.
See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
164 JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 48, at 135.
165 Andrew Emmerson, Conceptualizing Security Exceptions: Legal Doctrine
or Political
Excuse?, 11 J. INT'L EcON. L. 135, 145 (2008).
166 MATSUSHITA ETAL., supra note 23, at 223.
167 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp
162
163

Products,WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp].
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While this decision was controversial, the parties to the dispute abided by
the ruling.'16 In another case, the Appellate Body evaluated whether a
measure to ban certain gambling services could be justified as a measure
aimed at protecting public morals.' 6 ' The WTO Appellate Body did not
hesitate to give this controversial provision objective content, and its ruling
was implemented by the parties involved.170
Similarly, although fleshing out the objective content of Article XXI's
national security exception may be controversial, such controversy has been
proven to no longer pose a threat to the foundations of the WTO and thus is
no longer a sufficient reason for refusing to decide the economic aspects of a
national security dispute. The exception in Article XXI should not be treated
differently than the exceptions contained in Article XX, especially given the
legislative history of these two provisions."' The national security exception
was originally drafted as part of Article XX.'7 When it was later removed
and made a separate, freestanding provision, the GATT drafters "generally
agreed that this removal would not affect the application of the dispute
settlement mechanism regarding the new article.""' To treat the national
security exception differently than the general exceptions would undermine
the originally negotiated balance between members' rights to invoke an
exception and the rights of other members under the agreements. As the
Appellate Body stated in U.S.-Shrimp:
To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an
exception would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its
own treaty obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other
Members. If the abuse or misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive,
the Member, in effect, reduces its treaty obligation to a merely
facultative one and dissolves its juridical character, and, in so doing,
negates altogether the treaty rights of other Members. 1'

168

J. Patrick Kelley, Naturalism in InternationalAdjudication, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.

395, 411-15 (2008) (discussing the process by which the Appellate Body interpreted Article
XX(g) and noting that the controversial nature of its decision did not prevent the Appellate
Body from taking the decision or prevent the parties from considering it binding).
169 Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of

Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.Gambling].
170 See generally Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretationand the WTO Appellate Body Report
in US-Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT'L EcoN L. 117 (2006) (critiquing the controversial

interpretive approach taken by the Appellate Body).
171MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 23, at 223.
172
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Continued refusal to decide disputes concerning national security measures
permits abuse of that exception to the detriment of other WTO members and
the international community as a whole.
The harm to the international community at large is particularly acute
given that continued refusal to decide national security disputes perpetuates
the WTO's failure to perform its intended role as co-governor of
international security. The WTO covered agreements have a role to play in
international security governance. In fact, if it were given objective content,
the national security exception itself could further such governance. As two
scholars have suggested, "Article XXI(b)(iii) should be interpreted to
support trade measures enacted as countermeasures that are proportioned to
an illegal act committed by the target state and are designed to secure
compliance with international legal norms.""' When the WTO refuses to
exercise its supplemental governance authority, as it did in the Nicaragua
case, it weakens the overall international security governance system.

IV. EXAMINING

THE POSSIBILITIES IN CURRENT EVENTS: FORESEEABLE
CHALLENGES TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY MEASURES
IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

In times of international conflict, the U.S. often couples military strategy
with economic sanctions as part of its overall national security strategy. In
fact, "[t]he United States is the leading proponent of export sanctions to
accomplish foreign policy and national security objectives."' 76 The U.S.
currently maintains economic sanctions of some form against Iran, Burma,
Syria, Cuba, and North Korea.' 7 The sanctions imposed against Iran are
particularly sweeping, causing controversy in the international community
and possibly giving rise to a claim under the GATT.
Four Security Council resolutions authorize member states to undertake
increasingly stringent rounds of sanctions against Iran."' The last of these
resolutions was issued in June 2010179 and came only after a long stalemate
in the Security Council with regard to the proper course of further action
toward Iran. In early 2008, the U.S. was joined by the European Union in
175 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 23, at 224 (citing Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the
Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATTs Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 558, 603

(1991)).
76

Id. at 217.
See generally Deloitte Financial Advisory Services, Anti-Money-Laundering and
Economic Sanctions Compliance: Looking Beyond Borders 2 (2008).
1

11

The resolutions are: S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006), S.C. Res.
1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007), S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar.
3, 2008), and S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).
179 S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 178.
178
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seeking yet another round of sanctions through the United Nations; however,
deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Russia caused those plans to
fail.' Further protests by China, which engages in a large amount of oil and
natural gas trade with Iran, ensured that the Security Council would not
impose new sanctions.'"' Instead, in September 2008, the Security Council
issued Resolution 1835, which repeated demands for an end to Iran's nuclear
program but did not impose additional sanctions that year. 8 2 In the wake of
Resolution 1835, the U.S. indicated that it would pursue harsher unilateral
sanctions against Iran.'13
Since assuming office, President Barack Obama has taken an
increasingly tough stance toward Iran on the nuclear issue. In September
2009, the United Nations passed a U.S.-proposed resolution that called for
all members to be mindful of its previous resolutions on the issue of nuclear
disarmament, but it did not single out Iran.'84 Then, on October 1, 2009, the
U.S., the other permanent members of the Security Council, and Germany
held talks with Iran about its nuclear program.' The talks were intensified
by the revelation several days earlier that Iran had been secretly operating an
underground nuclear facility.'"' After the talks, Obama stated, "If Iran does
not take steps in the near future to live up to its obligations, then the United
States will not continue negotiating indefinitely, and we are prepared to
move towards increased pressure. . . . [O]ur patience is not unlimited.""

Indeed, as diplomatic efforts failed, the United Nations Security Council
issued a new round of sanctions through Resolution 1929.
Resolution 1929 requires foreign inspection of ships or planes traveling
to and from Iran when banned cargo is suspected to be present and imposes
restrictions on military purchases, trade, and financial transactions by the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.' Commentators are quick to point out
180 Peter Crail, West May Seek Alternative Sanctions on Iran, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (NOV.

2008) available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008 11/west.
181Robert McMahon, Iran, the United Nations and Sanctions, BACKGROUNDER (Apr. 4, 2006),

availableat www.cfr.org/publication/10222/iran-theunited-nations-and-sanctions.html.
182 S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835 (Sept. 27, 2008).
183Crail, supra note 180, at 2.
184 See S.C. Res. 1887, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009); see also Obama says 'Iran
on
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in

Nuclear Standoff, FOX

NEWS,

Sept.

25,

2009,

available at
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185

Obama in Iran inspection demand, BBC NEWS,

Oct. 2,

2009, available at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/8285794.stm.
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Id.

Press Release, Remarks by the President on the Meeting of the P5 + 1 Regarding Iran (Oct.
1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press office/Remarks-by-thePresident-on-the-meeting-of-the-P5-plus- -regarding-Iran/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
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that Resolution 1929 "took months to negotiate and major concessions by
American officials, but still failed to carry the symbolic weight of
unanimous decision."l 8 9 Despite participating in the Security Council
proceedings, "the United States and Europe acknowledged before
negotiations started that the they would not get the tough sanctions they were
hoping for, promising to enact harsher measures on their own . . . ."'90
In fulfillment of the promise of additional, stricter, unilateral action,
President Obama signed into law new sanctions against Iran in June 2010.1'9
Generally speaking, the sanctions "penalize companies supplying Iran with
gasoline and international banking institutions involved with Iran's
increasingly powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or its nuclear
program."l9 Companies supplying gasoline to the Iranian market risk being
banned from the "U.S. banking system, property transactions and foreign
exchange in the United States."' 93 Suppliers of other goods to the Iranian
market that might be used to assist Iran with its refining capacity also risk
sanctions under the law. 94
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Although the Obama administration speaks of these sanctions as though
they are only a natural outgrowth of the United Nations action, the U.S.
unilateral action remains an example of the U.S. taking issues of
international security outside the bounds of Security Council-authorized
action. Because the U.S. faces opposition from other Security Council
members on the issue of Iranian sanctions,195 it is unlikely that the United
Nations can effectively govern this national security issue. The WTO was
designed to provide supplementary international security governance in
precisely this type of situation. The WTO, furthermore, would have
jurisdiction to hear a complaint about the penalties imposed in the U.S.
market upon foreign entities supplying gasoline and other goods to Iran. The
most fruitful complaint would likely charge that the provision violates
GATT Article XI.
GATT Article XI prohibits WTO members from enacting quantitative
restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges.' A ban on imports and
exports, even one conditioned on certain circumstances, is considered a form
of quantitative restriction.'97 Thus, a nation such as Germany, which engages
in substantial trade with Iran,' 98 could argue that the U.S. sanctions violate
Article XI when they prohibit German companies from importing or
exporting goods to Iran. The U.S. would undoubtedly argue that the
sanctions fall under the national security exception of GATT Article XXI.
If Germany were to win the hypothetical dispute, international
governance would newly define the bounds of a nation's sovereign authority
to impose unilateral economic sanctions for national security objectives. If
the U.S. successfully defends the challenge, the WTO will finally have had
the opportunity to flesh out the objective content of the national security
exception and set the outer bounds of the defense. In either case, bringing
the dispute before the WTO would provide the DSS an opportunity to
engage in the weighing and balancing of trade considerations and national
security concerns for which it is responsible. In so doing, the WTO might
ease tensions between the major powers and pave the way for further
collaboration to bring an end to Iran's nuclear program. Such a result would
truly represent the WTO's reinstatement to its forgotten role in governing
international security.
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CONCLUSION

The framers of the WTO intended for it to play a role in international
security governance: namely, to supplement the governance actions of the
United Nations by parallel efforts in the economic sphere. Because the WTO
has routinely avoided its responsibility to reach the merits of disputes
involving national security matters, and the United Nations processes often
end in stalemate or failures of enforcement, nation-states often take
unilateral action without fear of reproach. This situation undermines the
legitimacy of the international legal system as a whole.
To rectify this problem, the WTO should interpret the national security
exception contained in GATT Article XXI as containing objective criteria
for application and reach the merits of security cases that come before it in
the future. Advances in WTO structure, especially from the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, and in WTO jurisprudence, especially
interpretations of GATT Article XX, the general exceptions clause, weaken
the common objections to allowing the GATT to fulfill its role of
supplementary international security co-governor. In fact, the WTO's unique
dispute settlement features remedy the three primary failures of the ICJ,
making the prospect of WTO security governance in economic matters more
viable. Especially when the Security Council cannot act or when United
Nations members undertake unilateral action, the WTO can, and should,
assume its forgotten role as co-governor of national security conflicts.

